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“The dominant facilitator of globalization process has always been the sea.”
(Sam Trangerdi)
Abstract
As an archipelagic country, border settlement is one of the critical 
issues for Indonesia. Ten countries have maritime borders with In-
donesia: Australia, The Philippines, India, Malaysia, Palau, Pap-
ua New Guinea, Singapore, Thailand, Timor Leste, and Vietnam. 
Therefore, this aspect becomes more important for Indonesia’s for-
eign policy, particularly after the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) 
doctrine was launched by President Joko Widodo (popularly 
known as Jokowi). The GMF initiated by President Joko Widodo 
contains a derivative policy on strengthening Indonesia’s border 
diplomacy. It is also emphasised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in its strategic goals 2015–2019. To reinforce this policy, Indonesia 
needs to take decisive actions, such as by giving instructions for 
sinking boats whenever they are caught fishing illegally or firing 
warning shots on illegal boats trespassing Indonesia’s territorial 
seas. These incidents often trigger diplomatic tensions with neigh-
bouring countries. However, as Indonesia’s maritime doctrine, 
GMF also emphasises working with other countries in maritime-
based cooperation for various dimensions, including the settlement 
of maritime borders, and in order to delineate maritime borders, 
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negotiations with neighbouring countries are inevitable. Against 
this background, this article aims to elucidate the dynamics of In-
donesia’s borders diplomacy under the doctrine of GMF. How 
should Indonesia engage in border diplomacy under the GMF? 
What are the most likely challenges facing Indonesia in dealing 
with border diplomacy that would arise under this new situation? 
This article argues that the doctrine of GMF has bolstered the ef-
forts of the Indonesian government to take serious action on mari-
time border diplomacy. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s border diplomacy 
under the GMF is still facing major challenges.
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INTRODUCTION
The growing discourse on Indonesia’s maritime sector has been a re-
markable breakthrough of President Joko Widodo’s foreign policy. By 
adopting pro-people diplomacy’s doctrine, President Joko Widodo (popular-
ly known as Jokowi) aimed to use Indonesia’s foreign policy as a strategic 
instrument for the benefit of Indonesians. Of the various actions, giving 
special attention to building and empowering the maritime sector has 
been the strategic action of Jokowi’s administration. For Indonesia, this vi-
sion is inevitably based on various factors, including the nature of Indone-
sia as an archipelagic country where the ocean symbolizes very important 
meanings in history, economics, and geopolitics.
The president’s commitment to maritime security is followed by the 
launch of the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF). It is Jokowi’s maritime 
doctrine that aims to accelerate and evenly spread Indonesia’s economic 
growth and make Indonesia’s economy more efficient and competitive. It 
contains plans on how the maritime sector could contribute to the coun-
try’s economy. Thus, the GMF was launched to fulfil President Jokowi’s 
commitment to developing and empowering Indonesia’s maritime sector. 
On the other hand, the GMF doctrine also implies significant chal-
lenges. One of them is the settlement of maritime borders. The GMF initi-
ated by President Joko Widodo aimed to strengthen Indonesia’s border di-
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plomacy. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its strategic goals 
for 2015–2019 emphasised this vision. To reinforce this policy, it is una-
voidable for Indonesia to take decisive actions, such as giving instructions 
to sinking boats whenever they are caught fishing illegally or firing warn-
ing shots on illegal boats trespassing Indonesia territorial seas. These are 
often triggered by diplomatic incidents with neighbouring countries. How-
ever, the Indonesian maritime doctrine, GMF, also emphasises working 
with other countries in maritime-based cooperation for various dimen-
sions. For the delineation of maritime borders, negotiations with neigh-
bouring countries are inevitable. This article aims to elucidate the dynam-
ics of Indonesia’s border diplomacy under the doctrine of the GMF. How 
should Indonesia apply border diplomacy under the GMF? What are the 
challenges facing Indonesia when dealing with border diplomacy that 
would arise under this new situation? This article argues that the doctrine 
of GMF has bolstered the efforts of the Indonesian government to take se-
rious action on maritime border diplomacy. Nevertheless, Indonesia’s bor-
der diplomacy under the GMF is still facing major challenges.
As an archipelagic country that adopted the archipelago outlook con-
cept (Wawasan Nusantara), Indonesia has maritime borders with 10 
neighbouring countries: India, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Malaysia, 
Singapore, The Philippines, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Australia, and Ti-
mor Leste. However, the border agreements have not been fully completed 
and they still have much work to do on them.
When the first negotiation started in 1970, except Palau and Timor 
Leste, Indonesia already had 18 maritime border agreements with 8 
neighbouring states. The aspects that have been agreed on, among others, 
are continental shelf and territorial sea. However, it is not the case for the 
Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ). The negotiation on EEZ with almost all 
neighbouring countries is still a long way from being settled. To exercise 
the link between GMF and settlement of maritime borders, this article is 
divided into several sections. The first section will elaborate on the princi-
ple doctrine of President Jokowi that is labelled as pro people diplomacy. 
The second part will discuss the origin of GMF and how it links with the 
effort to resolve maritime border disputes. The third section will present 
an analysis of Indonesia’s action in managing its border diplomacy, par-
ticularly in the maritime boundaries. The last part will present the conclu-
sion. 
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JOKOWI’S PRO-PEOPLE DIPLOMACY
Indonesian foreign policy under Jokowi’s administration adopted a 
pro-people diplomacy approach. Under this vision, President Jokowi made 
strong efforts to carry out diplomacy activities for the benefit of the people. 
Diplomacy and foreign policy should actively deliver direct impacts on the 
people’s economy. 
However, Jokowi’s pro-people diplomacy is not an entirely new doc-
trine for Indonesian foreign policy. It has strong roots with the independ-
ent and active doctrine, underlining the main principles of Indonesian for-
eign policy. In this part, we shall discuss the independent and active 
foreign policy and how it links with Indonesia’s current approach – Joko-
wi’s vision of pro people diplomacy. Elaborating the background is thus 
crucial to understanding the nature of Indonesia foreign policy.
Independent and active, known as “bebas dan aktif”, have been the 
main principles of Indonesia’s foreign policy since the early period of the 
nation. It became the doctrine for Jakarta in its interactions with other 
states at the regional and global level. In light of these strong words, Indo-
nesia started becoming independent of alliances or political blocks that ex-
isted in the global stage. At the same time, they also imply Jakarta’s will-
ingness to enhance its role in the international community.
The “bebas dan aktif” doctrine shows Indonesia’s respect for sover-
eignty over other states. According to Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia adopts 
the active and independent doctrine because Indonesia does not wish to 
align itself with either the Western bloc or the Communist bloc. The active 
dimension shows that Indonesia actively carries out a peaceful policy as a 
loyal member of the United Nations.1） The independent dimension in the 
doctrine implies that the Indonesian government does not interfere with 
other states’ domestic political issues. As sovereignty is a sensitive aspect 
of every state, offending this aspect could easily bring countries to conflict. 
Indonesia believes each state has its own national autonomy and that 
should be mutually respected. 
Pro-people diplomacy made Indonesian foreign policy focus on people’s 
interest in Indonesian foreign diplomacy. It aims to secure the needs of In-
 1）  Mohammad Hatta, “Indonesia between the Power Blocs,” Journal of Foreign Affairs 36, 
no.3 (1958): 480.
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donesian people first and foremost. With regard to the origin, this doctrine 
also can be regarded as the result of the evaluation of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono’s (SBY) foreign policy. During SBY’s period, Indonesia adopted 
the “thousand friends – zero enemies” policy, which President Jokowi 
thought created a distance between the policy and domestic needs. Under 
this approach, foreign policy is often placed at the high profile level but 
lacks the roots of the domestic aspect. Therefore, in practice, Indonesia has 
often been viewed as receiving few benefits from foreign diplomacy with 
the others gaining more. Against this background, Jokowi’s administration 
embraced the new approach, i.e. “diplomasi pro-rakyat” or pro people di-
plomacy, embracing domestic needs as the centre of Indonesia’s foreign 
policy.
Jokowi’s pro people diplomacy has its roots in the independent and ac-
tive doctrine. The pro people diplomacy blends two strategies but with dif-
ferent levels of emphasis. If SBY’s diplomacy emphasised Indonesia’s pres-
ence in the regional stage, pro-people diplomacy focuses on optimizing all 
diplomacy activities to lead to domestic economic benefits. In this sense, 
the domestic factor becomes an important factor in the formation of Joko-
wi’s foreign policy. 
The launch of pro-people diplomacy is also influenced by President 
Jokowi’s domestic life and idiosyncrasies. It is strongly related to the back-
ground of Jokowi and what people had expected from him during the elec-
tions. With a strong image as a figure who was born from a non-elitist peo-
ple, Jokowi has been widely expected as representing wong cilik or “poor 
people”. Under that image, Jokowi was respected as a populist figure. This 
framing also influenced the way in which Jokowi constructed the policy – 
It should not be elitist but must be populist. Therefore, domestic influenc-
es contributed significantly to the formulation of pro people diplomacy.
Following Jokowi’s direction on pro-people’s foreign policy approach, 
Indonesian foreign minister Retno Marsudi translated its new approach 
on her first annual policy statement on 8 January 2015. According to her, 
Indonesia will focus on three priorities: maintaining Indonesia’s sovereign-
ty, enhancing the protection of Indonesian citizens, and intensifying eco-
nomic diplomacy.2）
On another occasion, she also placed emphasis on three imperative di-
 2） Ibid.
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rections as derivatives of the pro-people foreign policy. The first direction 
was that of strengthening Indonesia’s economy on diplomacy activity. In 
order to achieve this, there must be a mutual connection between the di-
mensions of foreign policy and economic development policy. The second 
direction was actively using the bilateral mechanism as a diplomatic in-
strument rather than multilateral forums. Resources would be directed to 
the bilateral forum instead of spending energy to activate multilateral fo-
rums. The third direction was that of enabling diplomat officers to be more 
active in promoting Indonesia’s economic competitive advantages.3） Diplo-
mats are expected to play the necessary role to integrate Indonesia with 
the world market.
ORIGIN OF THE GMF’S DOCTRINE
This section elaborates on the origin of GMF as Indonesia’s maritime 
doctrine. How did the GMF doctrine emerge? In what context was the 
GMF doctrine implemented to transform Indonesia as a maritime power 
in the region? In this section, it will be argued that the doctrine of GMF is 
an evolutionary concept. Although the idea of GMF has been perceived as 
a novelty to many, it is not an entirely new idea.
The GMF espoused by President Jokowi in 2014 has been a long tra-
dition in the Indonesian foreign policy’s direction. It is actually not an en-
tirely new concept. The elite’s awareness of importance of maritime vision 
had risen since the Soekarno era. After the independence declaration in 
1945, Indonesia’s territory was set from the Netherlands 1939 Ordinance 
on Territorial Waters and Maritime Zones. However, this territorial divi-
sion and the three-mile extent of sovereign water were vulnerable to for-
eign maritime encroachment in the archipelago. As a response to that dy-
namic, it was Prime Minister Djuanda who declared Indonesia as an 
archipelagic state, which then is known as Djuanda Declaration 1957. 4） 
This declaration formed the foundation for President Soekarno to formu-
 3）  Parameswaran, P, “The Trouble with Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Priorities under Jokowi.” 
The Diplomat, date, 2015, accessed June 5, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/the-trou-
ble-with-indonesias-foreign-policy-priorities-under-jokowi/.
 4）  The Djuanda Declaration 1957 that has been widely recognised as the embryo of Indone-
sia’s archipelagic doctrine depended largely on the interest to gain wide recognition of a 
newly independent Indonesia. 
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late the concept of Wawasan Nusantara or Indonesia archipelagic outlook 
in 1966.5） The concept of Archipelago Outlook is a political concept reflect-
ing that Indonesia is a unified archipelago. On the other hand, it is also in-
dicative of Indonesia’s acute sense of vulnerability in its maritime do-
main.6）
Furthermore, the concept of Wawasan Nusantara was conveyed by the 
Indonesian government to various international forums. The agenda was 
to introduce and spread the idea that Indonesia is an Archipelagic State in 
the international community. Through the active campaigns conducted by 
the Indonesian government, in 1982, the concept of Archipelagic State has 
achieved recognition and the concept was adopted in the third United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).7） Under Law 
No.17/1985, Indonesia had ratified the result of the UNCLOS. Thus, it be-
comes the main sprit of Indonesia’s maritime direction. 
The concerns regarding the maritime sector had risen in the period of 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s administration (popularly known as SBY). 
During SBY’s period, the framework on maritime security was introduced 
as the national security framework. SBY set the agenda projecting Indone-
sia as a major player in the Indo-Pacific water region. It was also reiterat-
ed by Marty Natalegawa, foreign minister in SBY’s period, who empha-
sised the importance of Indonesia’s role in the Indian Ocean.8） From the 
global perspective, this option was embraced, considering the trend of 
global pendulum at that time moved towards to the East. The Eastern re-
gion had become the new centre of gravity for politics and economics glob-
ally. 9） It was also prompted by Indonesia’s active involvement and election 
as the vice chair of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooper-
 5）  Ahmad Habir and Muhammad Tri Andika, “Normative Priorities and Contradictions in In-
donesia’s Foreign Policy; From Wawasan Nusantara to Democracy.” Australia National 
University, 2014, p.54, accessed date, http://nsc.anu.edu.au/documents/Indonesia-Article7.
pdf.
 6） Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983).
 7）  UNCLOS defines the maritime zone of jurisdiction in three parts: territorial sea (12 m), 
Exclusive Economic Zone (200 m), and continental shelf. Under the UNCLOS jurisdiction, 
Indonesia got more than what it originally asked for.
 8）  Evelyn Goh, “Making Waves,” Australia: New Mandala Journal, 15 June 2015, accessed 
July 20, 2016, http://www.newmandala.org/making-waves/.
 9）  Keshav Prasad, “Indonesia and the Emergence of New Strategic Dynamics in Asia-Pacific 
Analysis,” Eurasia Review, vol, issue (2012), accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.eurasiare-
view.com/24082012-indonesia-and-the-emergence-of-new-strategic-dynamics-in-asia-pacif-
ic-analysis/.
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ation (IORA-RC) for the period 2013–2015.10） This was in line with SBY’s 
foreign policy vision of, increasing Indonesia’s leadership at the regional 
and global level. 
The spirit of Indonesia’s leadership at the regional and global levels 
was very imminent with the President Jokowi’s GMF. As mentioned by Ri-
zal Sukma, one of the key advisors of foreign policy of President Jokowi, 
the idea of GMF aimed to transform Indonesia into the fulcrum of the two 
strategic oceans, the Pacific and Indian. However, it also had a slightly dif-
ferent maritime vision than that in SBY’s period. Jokowi’s GMF doctrine 
is wider. It aims at more than just increasing Indonesia’s regional leader-
ship. In fact, Jokowi’s maritime orientation is similar to the Chinese mari-
time concept, with a strong emphasis on building the new 21st century 
maritime Silk Road. 11）
Moreover, the launch of GMF could be seen as the effort of President 
Jokowi’s administration to increase the presence of the state in the mari-
time sphere. Since Indonesia’s waters contain abundant natural resources 
that could be converted to economic revenue, the GMF is a strategic in-
strument to capitalise Indonesia’s water sphere.
There is also an argument that Indonesia’s reorientation towards its 
ocean was the product of an elite conception in serving Indonesia’s geopoli-
tics and aspirations in accordance to its domestic needs.12） This view is in 
line with the view that the maritime doctrine is an evolutionary concept 
but with emphasis on Jokowi’s pro people diplomacy, which means Indone-
sia’s diplomacy can have a direct impact on its people. 
However, what makes the pro people diplomacy interesting and dis-
tinct from the previous maritime doctrine is that it is rooted in President 
Jokowi’s commitment to the maritime sector. It is should be acknowledged 
that the GMF has succeeded in not only increasing the awareness of Indo-
nesians about the maritime sector but also convincing the international 
community that Indonesia has a strong commitment to its status as an ar-
 10）  Veeramallah Anjaiah, “RI elected as vice-chair of Indian Ocean Rim Association,” The Ja-
karta Post, 5 November 2013, accessed July 20, 2016, http://www.thejakartapost.com/
news/2013/11/05/ri-elected-vice-chair-indian-ocean-rim-association.html.
 11） Ibid.
 12）  This argument was echoed by Mr. Jonathan Chen during the conference on “Indonesia’s 
Global Maritime Fulcrum Challenges and Trajectories”. The result of the discussion can be 
retrieved from https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/ER160714_Global-Mar-
itime-Fulcrum.pdf.
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chipelagic country. These are the features of Jokowi’s GMF that made it 
more attractive and prominent although it is not entirely a new concept. 
As the GMF was constructed by President Jokowi, it is worth tracing 
the background of Jokowi’s GMF. The discourse on Indonesia’s maritime 
power started to get more attention after the presidential debate in 2014. 
As a presidential candidate, Jokowi tried to establish his distinction 
through his vision. Jokowi was committed, as written in his manifesto, to 
revamp Indonesia into a GMF.13） The idea had been reiterated in various 
forums, including his inauguration speech in October 2014. To strengthen 
his commitment to the maritime sector, he used the unique words Jalsveva 
Jayamah, emphasising his vision to make Indonesia a maritime nation.14）
As Indonesia’s maritime doctrine, the GMF has been an important in-
strument showing that Indonesia has been aware of and responsive to the 
current geopolitical situation. The GMF is a tool for Indonesia to delineate 
its position in the region and Indonesia has a solid strategy to respond to 
potential external security threats. The growing military presence in the 
Pacific Ocean, the escalation in South China Sea, and the growing tension 
in Natuna after China’s claim over it, in fact, have bolstered Indonesia’s 
fears.
In addition to the security factor, the GMF is strongly related to the 
efforts of the government in optimising the state’s revenue from the mari-
time sector. As mentioned by President Jokowi on many occasions, the con-
tribution of the maritime sector now is still less than 30% of the GDP. In 
2014 and 2015, government’s income from the fishery sector was only 
about 250 billion rupiah.15） In fact, the potential revenue that could be ex-
tracted from the maritime sector is about US$ 1.2 trillion.16） Therefore, 
given with the vast maritime area and its abundant resources, the low 
Government revenue from maritime and fishery sectors has become the 
 13）  Indonesia Secretariat Cabinet, “President Jokowi at IMO Forum; I’m Committed to mak-
ing Indonesia Global Maritime Fulcrum,” Indonesia Secretariat Cabinet, 20 April 2016, ac-
cessed July 2016 http://setkab.go.id/en/president-jokowi-at-imo-forum-im-committed-to-
making-indonesia-global-maritime-fulcrum/.
 14）  Jakarta Globe, “Jokowi’s Inaugural Speech as Nation’s Seventh President,” Jakarta Globe, 
October, 20, 2014, accessed March 15, 2016, http://jakartaglobe.beritasatu.com/news/
jokowis-inaugural-speech-nations-seventh-president/.
 15） Badan Pusat Statistik (Indonesia Statistic Agency)
 16）  Arie C. Meliala, “Potensi Laut Indonesia Belum Dimanfaatkan Secara Optimal,” Pikiran 
Rakyat, June 15, 2016, accessed October 25, 2016, http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/nasion-
al/2016/06/15/potensi-laut-indonesia-belum-dimanfaatkan-secara-optimal-371905.
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background to Jokowi’s administration to optimise the revenue from the 
maritime sector for the well-being of its citizens.
MARITIME BORDER DIPLOMACY
The current global trend shows that a state’s interaction may be con-
ducted in a borderless word. However, for a state entity, the national bor-
der remains when performing important function as an identity. Since bor-
der and sovereignty are very closely linked, border diplomacy is a vital 
element for a state to delaminate its sovereignty. The border is the prima-
ry aspect for every state enforcing its territory and exclusion. Also, the 
border is the central feature of a state’s architecture in global politics, ori-
enting the convergence of people with a given territory and notions of a 
common history, nationality, identity, language, and culture.17）
However, in the age of global interdependence, there is a rising chal-
lenge facing the state’s border. The border is no longer seen as an exclusive 
territorial barrier. The border, in fact, has become a strategic point for eve-
ry state where economic, political, and social interactions take place. The 
global environment that contains economic benefits for state’s revenue has 
pushed every state to adapt to cross border movement. In addition, accord-
ing to Walker, the principle of sovereignty enables and depends upon spa-
tial demarcation between life inside and outside a centred political com-
munity. Within this concept lie the notions of here and there, us and them, 
affirming the presence of a political community.18）
Given the context as archipelagic countries, having solid maritime 
borders is an inevitable aspect for Indonesia in affirming its sovereign ter-
ritory. Without having a solid legal standing on maritime borders, Indone-
sia can be fragile in the case of maritime issues, such as border disputes, 
illegal fishing, or illegal ship trespassing. Furthermore, this makes Indo-
nesia vulnerable to tensions or disputes with neighbouring countries. Take 
the example of the incident between Malaysian fisherman, Indonesian pa-
trol boat, and Malaysian marine police in the waters off Tanjung Berakit 
in 2010. Another example is the incident between Indonesia and Malaysia 
 17）  Nick Vaughan, Border Politics; The Limits of Sovereign Power (Edinburgh University 
Press, 2012), 54
 18） Ibid
Indonesia Border Diplomacy Under The Global Maritime Fulcrum（ANDIKA）2017】 55
in the northern part of Malacca Strait in April 2010.19） These are a few ex-
amples of tensions emerging from unresolved maritime boundaries be-
tween two countries. Unresolved maritime boundaries will only present 
challenges to Indonesia in its security, economy, and political stability and 
disturb Indonesia’s national interest. Therefore, border diplomacy with 
neighbouring countries needs to be managed sensitively.
If we go back to the history of Indonesia’s maritime delimitation, the 
efforts to settle maritime boundaries with neighbouring countries were 
started in 1969. In the first round, Indonesia conducted negotiations with 
Malaysia, India, Thailand, Papua New Guinea (PNG), and Australia. It re-
sulted in 10 agreements of continental shelf. The process continued in 
1970–1973 with negotiations on the territorial boundary with Malaysia, 
PNG, and Singapore. After Indonesia ratified UNCLOS, in 1997, the nego-
tiation on Exclusive Economy Zone (EEZ) had started with Australia.
Furthermore, during SBY’s period, Indonesia made several agree-
ments on maritime boundaries. In 2014, Indonesia made a maritime bor-
der agreement with the Philippines. This agreement marked the end of 20 
years of negotiation between Indonesia and Philippines on the overlapping 
EEZs in the southern part of the Philippines. Indonesia also made another 
agreement with Singapore in 2009 on boundaries of the western section, 
and in 2014, on boundaries along the Singapore Strait.20）
It is worth noting that in the context of maritime border diplomacy, 
there are three types of maritime boundaries: territorial sea, EEZ, and 
continental shelf boundaries. With regard to these three types, Indonesia 
has five segments of joint land boundaries, 11 segments of joint territorial 
sea boundaries, 15 segments of joint EEZ boundaries, and 15 segments of 
joint continental shelf boundaries. As a result, in total, Indonesia has 46 
maritime boundary lines with 24 tri-junction points that need to be re-
solved with its neighbouring countries, and these numbers are yet to be 
completed.21） The following table illustrates the existing maritime bounda-
 19）  Made Andi Arsana, “Predicting Indonesia’s Maritime Boundaries,” The Jakarta Post, 2011, 
accessed October 5, 2016, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2011/12/22/predicting-indo-
nesia-s-maritime-boundaries.html.
 20）  Saiful Bahri, “Indonesia moves closer to ratifying maritime border treaty with Singapore,” 
Channel News Asia, 7 October 2016, accessed October 20, 2016, http://www.channelnewsasia.
com/news/asiapacific/indonesia-moves-closer-to-ratifying-maritime-border-treaty-
with/3187408.html.
 21）  Sobar Sutisna, “International Boundary Fixing and the Roles of Indonesian Surveyors,” 
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ry agreements between Indonesia and its neighbouring countries. 
Table 1.  Indonesia’s Maritime borders Agreements22）
State Agreements Date
Malaysia  1.   Agreements on Delimitation of the conti-
nental shelves between the two countries
27 October 1969
 2.   Treaty on delimitation of the Territorial 
Seas of the Two Countries in the Strait of 
Malacca
17 March 1970
Australia  3.   Agreement on establishing certain sea-bed 
countries
18 May 1971
 4.   Agreement on establishing certain sea-bed 
boundaries in the area of the Timor and 
Arafura seas, supplementary to the Agree-
ment of 18 May 1971
9 October 1972
 5.   Agreement concerning certain Boundaries 
between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia
12 February 1973
 6.   MOU on the operations of Indonesian Tra-
ditional Fisherman in Areas of the Australi-
an Exclusive Fishing Zone and Continental 
Shelf
7 November 1974
 7.   MOU Concerning the Implementation of a 
Provisional Fisheries Surveillance and En-
forcement Arrangement
29 October 1981
 8.   Treaty on establishing an exclusive econom-
ic zone boundary and certain seabed bound-
aries
14 March 1997
India  9.   Agreement on delimitation of the continen-
tal shelf boundary between the two coun-
tries
8 August 1974
10.   Agreement on the extension of the 1974 
continental shelf boundary between the two 
countries in the Andaman Sea and the Indi-
an Ocean
14 January 1977
Papua New Guinea 11.   Agreement concerning the Maritime Bound-
ary between the Republic of Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea and Cooperation on re-
lated Matters
13 December 1980
Australia FIG Congress, 2010, accessed October 2, 2016, https://www.fig.net/resources/pro-
ceedings/fig_proceedings/fig2010/papers/ts02a/ts02a_sutisna_3888.pdf.
 22）  I Made Arsana, “The Delineation of Indonesia’s Outer Limits Of Its Extended Continental 
Shelf And Preparation for its Submission: Status And Problems. (The United Nations-Nip-
pon Foundation Fellowship Programme 2007 – 2008).
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Singapore 12.   Agreement stipulating the Territorial Sea 
Boundary Lines between Indonesia and the 
Republic of Singapore in the Strait of Singa-
pore
25 May 1973
13.   Treaty Between the Republic of Indonesia 
and the Republic of Singapore relating to 
the Delimitation of the Territorial Seas of 
the Two Countries in the Eastern Part of 
the Strait of Singapore.
3 September 2014
Thailand 14.   Agreement between the Government of the 
Kingdom of Thailand and the Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the 
delimitation of a continental shelf boundary 
between the two countries in the northern 
part of the Straits of Malacca and in the An-
daman Sea
17 December 1971
15.   Agreement between the Government of the 
Kingdom of Thailand and the Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia relating to the 
delimitation of the sea-bed boundary be-
tween the two countries in the Andaman 
Sea
11 December 1975
India & Thailand 16.   Agreement between the Government of the 
Kingdom of Thailand, the Government of 
the Republic of India and the Government 
of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the 
determination of the tri-junction point and 
the delimitation of the related boundaries of 
the three countries in the Andaman Sea
22 June 1978
Malaysia & Thailand 17.   Agreement between the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia, the Government of 
Malaysia and the Government of the King-
dom of Thailand relating to the Delimita-
tion of the Continental Shelf Boundaries in 
the Northern Part of the Strait of Malacca
21 December 1971
Vietnam 18.   Agreement between the Government of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Indonesia con-
cerning the delimitation of the continental 
shelf boundary
26 June 2003
The Philippines 19.   The agreement delineates the boundaries of 
both nations’ overlapping exclusive econom-
ic zones in the Mindanao Sea, the Celebes 
Sea, and the Philippine Sea.
23 May 2014
It is also worth highlighting the progress that has been achieved on 
maritime borders. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its speaker, Mr 
Armanatha Cristian Nasir, claimed that 65% of Indonesia’s maritime 
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boundaries have been completed.23） Except with two countries, i.e. Palau 
and Timor Leste, Indonesia has 19 maritime border agreements with 8 
neighbouring states. Strikingly, most of the agreements just resolved the 
territorial and continental zone, but not the EEZ. The target to resolve 
EEZ is still a long way to be settled. 
Table 2.  Maritime boundaries between Indonesia and neighbouring countries





















To speed up the settlement of maritime borders, the Ministry of For-
eign Affairs adopted its vision into a strategic plan. The ministry created a 
roadmap regarding the need to hasten negotiations. There are several ne-
gotiations on maritime borders planned to settle between 2016 and 2019: 
initial meeting on maritime borders with Timor Leste; negotiations re-
garding EEZ with Vietnam; discussion on regional sea, EEZ, and continen-
tal shelf with Malaysia; and negotiations on the continental shelf with the 
Philippines.24） However, this vision still lacked implementation. Although 
Jokowi completed two years in presidency, the maritime doctrine provided 
few instructions. 
Table 3.  Progress status of negotiation on maritime boundaries
State Status
1.  Timor Leste Initial meeting
2.  Vietnam Negotiations on Economic Exclusive Zone
3.  Malaysia Talking on regional sea, economic exclusive zone, and continental shelf 
4.  The Philippines Negotiations on the continental shelf
 23）  Sugandi Afandi, “65 Percent of Maritime Borders Agreement, Finished (65 Persen Persoa-
lan Perbatasan Rampung,” RRI Jakarta, January 3, 2015, accessed July 15, 2016, http://
www.rri.co.id/post/berita/129994/nasional/kemenlu_65_persen_persoalan_perbatasan_
rampung.html.
 24）  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia, “Annual Press Statement Minister 
for Foreign Affairs 2015,” accessed June 8, 2016, http://www.kemlu.go.id/Documents/
PPTM%202015/PPTM%202015%20ENG%20FINAL%20PDF.pdf.
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The strategy of settlement maritime borders officially also has been in 
the Government’s Work Plan’s document (Rencana Kerja Pemerintah). Ac-
cording to the Government’s Work Plan 2017, the government has set 
gradual target to settle state’s maritime borders from 2014–2019. In 2015 
Indonesia targeted 6 negotiations, 12 negotiations in 2016 and 2017, and 
expected time for the all completion is by 2019. 
Table 4.  Indonesia government’s target of negotiations to resolve maritime borders25）
2014 2015 2016 2017 2019
1 state 6 negotiations 12 negotiations 12 negotiations Negotiations with 10 
maritime zone
In general, Indonesia has made significant progress with four neigh-
bouring countries: Malaysia, Singapore, The Philippines, and Timor Leste. 
With Malaysia, there have been 29 negotiation meetings on maritime 
boundary in the period of 2005–2016. Indonesia and Philippines carried 
out 8 meetings from 1994 to 2014, which concluded the EEZ boundary 
agreement in the Mindanao Sea, the Celebes Sea, and the Philippine Sea. 
With Singapore, Indonesia had 10 meetings from 2011 to 2014, which con-
cluded the Batam-Changi part. 26） 
During the years of Jokowi’s administration, several maritime border 
negotiations had just started. In mid-August 2015, Indonesia has just be-
gun negotiations with Timor Leste. Both nations share the maritime bor-
ders at three points: Ombai Strait, Wetar Strait, and Timor Sea. During 
the state visit of Prime Minister Rui Maria De Aroyo to Jakarta, both 
countries agreed to begin negotiations on unresolved land and maritime 
borders. Both countries realised that border settlement needs to be started 
soon to accelerate the trade and investment relations between them. Indo-
nesia and Timor Leste already had a similar meeting in 2013. It was dur-
ing the state visit of Prime Minister Xanana Gusmau to Jakarta. However, 
the process discontinued without any specific reason. The maritime issue 
with Timor Leste might be not as crucial as it is with Malaysia, but the 
maritime border with Timor Leste is important for Indonesia since the 
area contains a larger amount of fishing and other natural resources. 
 25） Document of Indonesian Government Work Plan 2017.
 26）  Explanation from Ambassador Eddy Pratomo, the Indonesia Special Envoy for border di-
plomacy with Malaysia.
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Progress has also been made with Vietnam. In 2003, Indonesia and 
Vietnam signed an agreement on maritime borders concerning the delimi-
tation of the continental shelf boundary. After the negotiation of EEZ, it 
seems like it has been “hibernating” for 12 years, but there is a bright sign 
for both countries to restart the negotiations on EEZ. According to Indone-
sia’s foreign affairs minister, Retno Marsudi, since 2014, the negotiations 
between both nations occurred 7 times. However, the efforts to resolve de-
limitation in EEZ have indeed been very challenging for both countries. 
Although Vietnam accepted Indonesia as an archipelagic country, both 
countries are yet to reach the consensus particularly on the standards for 
measuring borders.27）
Another significant development can be seen between Indonesia and 
Singapore. Both nations have signed the treaty relating to the Delimita-
tion of the Territorial Seas of the Two Countries in the Eastern Part of the 
Strait of Singapore on September 2014.28） Within two years of Jokowi’s 
presidency, in October 2016, the Indonesian government brought the trea-
ty to be ratified by parliament. While the process is on-going, the discus-
sion in its parliament has reached the final stage.
With regard to The Philippines, both countries have shared maritime 
borders on the continental shelf and EEZ. In May 2014, significant pro-
gress was achieved. Indonesia and The Philippines signed the agreement 
to delineate the boundaries of both nations’ overlapping EEZs in the 
Mindanao Sea, the Celebes Sea, and The Philippine Sea. In the latest 
agreement, both countries had another meeting in July 2016, ensuring 
commitment towards taking the final step. According to the statement of 
Retno Marsudi, the Indonesian foreign minister, both nations have agreed 
on the need to accelerate the settlement negotiations on the continental 
shelf boundaries.29）
 27）  Dimas Nurzaman,“Ten Nations to Negotiate Maritime Borders,” Gress News, March 14, 
2016, accessed June 8, 2016, http://gres.news/news/international/103941-ten-nations-to-ne-
gotiate-maritime-borders/0/.
 28）  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs The Republic of Indonesia, “Press statement on State Visit 
of the President of the Republic of Indonesia Dr Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 2 to 4 Sep-
tember 2014,” accessed June 20, 2016, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/
press_room/pr/2014/201409/press_20140903.html.
 29）  Liza Yosephine, “Indonesia, Philippines to finalize overlapping maritime boundaries nego-
tiations,” The Jakarta Post, July 2, 2016), accessed August 10, 2016, http://www.thejakarta-
post.com/news/2016/07/02/indonesia-philippines-to-finalize-overlapping-maritime-bounda-
ry-negotiations.html.
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The progress of negotiations can also be seen with Malaysia although 
at a slower pace. Between Indonesia and Malaysia, there are many bilat-
eral issues still pending. The settlement of agreement on the EEZ bounda-
ry is one of the many bilateral issues that are still pending. In February 
2015, President Jokowi made his first official bilateral visit to Malaysia as 
an opportunity to take the negotiation on the maritime boundaries to a 
new level. At that state visit, President Jokowi and PM Najib agreed to ex-
pedite the conclusion of the maritime boundaries and the Special Envoy 
Mechanism to give a political push to the process. As follow up, President 
Jokowi appointed Special Envoy, Ambassador Eddy Pratomo, to accelerate 
border diplomacy with Malaysia. Meanwhile, Malaysia also appointed Tan 
Sri Moh. Radzi as Special Envoy since 2014.
From the above explanations on the progress of negotiations, this arti-
cle argues that the government made great efforts to settle unresolved 
maritime boundaries. This is evidenced by the number of negotiations that 
succeeded within two years although all of these developments are still far 
from complete, except the agreement with Singapore that has entered the 
final step of ratification. 
CHALLENGES AHEAD
Although the GMF has raised public optimism about Indonesia’s 
ocean policy, the challenges ahead in implementing the GMF cannot be ig-
nored. This work found at least two important challenges that might be 
faced by related agencies in a bid to bring Indonesia towards the aim of 
being a GMF. The first challenge is the lack of a detailed plan on GMF, 
complicating the coordination among agencies. The second challenge is re-
lated to the economic slowdown experienced by Indonesia since 2015. 
The GMF has become the main strategic policy for Indonesia as an ar-
chipelagic state. Thus, to embody the goals, the GMF needs to have a de-
tailed plan. The initial expectation to know GMF’s derivative direction 
comes when the President Jokowi’s delivered his speech in the 9th East 
Asia Summit in Nay Pyi Daw, Myanmar 13 November 2014. In that forum, 
President Jokowi reiterated his commitment to make Indonesia a mari-
time power. President Jokowi conveyed Indonesia’s vision on GMF into 
five elements, namely (i) cultivating a maritime culture, (ii) preserving 
and managing maritime resources, (iii) developing maritime infrastruc-
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ture and connectivity, (iv) maritime cooperation through diplomacy, and (v) 
building a strong maritime defence.30）
Although President Jokowi has lowered the concept of GMF into five 
elements, actually it still provides little for Indonesia’s maritime agenda. 
The GMF vision is criticised because of the lack of an archetype or even 
master plan. It is still guided by a detailed policy blueprint. Although the 
efforts to realise the doctrine have been underway, there is no detailed doc-
ument plan. For example, the plan on the maritime sector has been includ-
ed in Indonesia’s National Medium Term Development Plan 2015–2019 al-
though the scope is still too broad.31） Moreover, as asserted by Keoni and 
Adhi, the omission of a detailed plan has two implications. First, since the 
maritime sector has an intersectoral agenda, with no detailed plan, coordi-
nation among the government agencies became difficult and complicated. 
Second, it also easily leads the government agencies linked with this sec-
tor to have various interpretations of the policy.32）
In addition to the lack of a detailed plan, the recent budget cuts for all 
ministries caused by the huge state revenue deficit also forms an impor-
tant challenge that needs to be considered. As the budget gap widened, 
President Jokowi demanded all ministries to restrain their spending. After 
the revision of fiscal shortfall to 2.5% of the GDP, there is gap in the state 
revenue of about 219 trillion rupiah ($16.7 billion).33） This is due to the re-
cent deterioration of the Indonesian economy caused by a shortfall in tax 
revenue and falling commodity prices. According to the Presidential In-
struction No 8/2016, President Jokowi reduced the budget for 85 state 
agencies. Furthermore, the budget for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
reduced to about 700.8 billion rupiah.34） Although the budget cut is not 
larger than that for other ministries such as the Ministry of Defense or 
 30）  Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Presiden Jokowi Deklarasikan Indonesia Sebagai 
Poros Maritim Dunia”, accessed June 25, 2016, http://www.kemlu.go.id/id/berita/siaran-
pers/Pages/Presiden-Jokowi-Deklarasikan-Indonesia-Sebagai-Poros-Maritim-Dunia.aspx.
 31）  Keoni Indrabayu and Adhi Priamarizki, “Indonesia’s maritime ambitions remain rudder-
less,” East Asia Forum, vol, issue (2016), accessed October 5, 2016, http://www.eastasiafo-
rum.org/2016/09/02/indonesias-maritime-ambitions-remain-rudderless/.
 32） Ibid.
 33）  Karlis Salna and Agus Salim, “Jokowi Demands Spending Restraint as Indonesia Budget 
Widens,” Bloomberg, date, 2016, accessed October 28, 2016, http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-08-04/jokowi-demands-spending-restraint-as-indonesia-budget-gap-
widens.
 34）  President Instruction No.8/2016, The Cabinet Secretariat of The Republic of Indonesia. 
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Ministry of Education, it inevitably has a significant impact on the diplo-
macy activities carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
It is worth noting that to execute maritime border diplomacy sensi-
tively, the Indonesian government needs to consider these two following 
factors: political principle and technical principle. The political principle 
promoted by good bilateral relations is a prerequisite for initiating border 
negotiations. Good diplomatic relations between Indonesia and its neigh-
bouring countries is important to accelerate maritime border settlement. 
However, there are some states, e.g. Palau, with whom Indonesia has nev-
er had negotiations on maritime border settlement owing to no diplomatic 
relations between them. The second principle is technical aspect, which in-
cludes survey activity, remote sensing, and other technical spatial map-
ping. This aspect is no less important than the political principle. Without 
comprehensive supporting documents, the process of negotiation would be 
uncertain. 
CONCLUSION
To sum up, the settlement of maritime border disputes is essential to 
support the GMF’s agenda. Another point supporting the doctrine is that 
having a firm maritime border is in line with international law; therefore, 
it is critical for Indonesia to continue its agenda on its maritime sector. It 
is a pivotal factor for Indonesia’s efforts to transform the country as a 
global maritime power. Thus, Indonesia could effectively manage all re-
sources within its sovereignty and use them for the benefit of the people. 
This article also argued that the doctrine of GMF has bolstered the ef-
forts of the Indonesian government to take serious action on maritime bor-
der diplomacy. This can be seen from several evidences, such as the open-
ing negotiations on maritime boundaries with Timor Leste, negotiations 
on exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundaries with Vietnam and Malaysia, 
continuing negotiations on continental shelf boundaries with The Philip-
pines, and ratification of maritime agreement with Singapore that has en-
tered the final stage. 
Nevertheless, Indonesia’s border diplomacy under the GMF still faces 
major challenges. The first challenge arises from the lack of a detailed 
plan or strategic map in implementing GMF, particularly for accelerating 
the settlement of maritime borders. The government could argue that they 
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have already set the plan on the National Ocean Policy or in the Paper of 
Government Work Plan. However, the documents of Government Work 
Plan have few details on concrete tactics. In addition, the challenge for In-
donesia lays in the inability of state agencies to resolve issues in a timely 
schedule. 
Another potential challenge is triggered from Indonesia’s economic 
slowdown. After the revision of the fiscal shortfall to 2.5% of GDP in mid-
2016, there is gap in state revenue of about 219 trillion rupiah (US$16.7 
billion). As a consequence, President Jokowi reduced the budget for 85 
state agencies, including the budget for the Ministry of Foreign affairs 
that was reduced to about 700.8 billion rupiah. The state budget cut is 
strongly believed to influence the performance of maritime border diplo-
macy.
Moreover, other challenges come from the effort to fulfil the main 
principles in border diplomacy. The settlement of maritime border dis-
putes requires the fulfilment of two important aspects: political principle 
and technical principle. As discussed above, both aspects are needed to run 
negotiations. Without good diplomatic relations with neighbouring coun-
tries, the negotiation process would be very complicated. On the other 
hand, to have solid preparations on all technical matters is also crucial for 
supporting the negotiation. Without comprehensive supporting document, 
the process of negotiation would follow an uncertain path. 
Although there are still many challenges ahead, the presence of 
GMF’s doctrine has increased public awareness on the significance of mar-
itime security for Indonesia’s national interest. The GMF has succeeded in 
enhancing the significance of maritime security for Indonesia’s national 
policy. The sea power is not only about the physical instrument of naval or 
military force but also about the non-physical aspects, i.e. agreement on 
maritime borders. The agreements on maritime borders are imperative for 
enhancing Indonesia’s maritime capacity.
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